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Political campaigns often produce memorable moments. 
A candidate misspeaks or a scandal is exposed, and the 
campaign momentum swings rapidly. People tend to 
vote on the basis of their recollection of candidates and 
campaign events (Lau & Redlawsk, 2006), but are these 
memories always accurate? Can voters be influenced to 
form false memories for fabricated events during a polit-
ical campaign?
False Memories
Many studies have demonstrated the ease with which 
individuals can form rich false memories (Loftus, 2005). 
The source-monitoring framework ( Johnson, Hashtroudi, 
& Lindsay, 1993) posits that memories are not stored 
with tags that identify their source. Instead, the source 
is inferred through a rapid evaluation of the memory 
details, including heuristic judgments (e.g., temporal, 
spatial, and affective qualities) and systematic judg-
ments (e.g., comparing the memory with preexisting 
beliefs and knowledge). For example, when asked 
about a political scandal, a voter makes a series of 
judgments, both heuristic (Is this recollection vivid and 
detailed?) and systematic (Is this in line with other 
information I have about this politician?). False memo-
ries can arise when these mechanisms lead individuals 
to unwittingly manufacture thoughts and images and 
mistake them for prior experience (Sacchi, Agnoli, & 
Loftus, 2007; Strange, Garry, Bernstein, & Lindsay, 
2011).
Research suggests that individuals may be particu-
larly susceptible to forming false memories about 
events that are congruent with their beliefs. Frenda, 
Knowles, Saletan, and Loftus (2013) presented partici-
pants with true and fabricated political events and 
found that liberals were more likely to “remember” 
President Bush vacationing with a famous baseball 
864887 PSSXXX10.1177/0956797619864887Murphy et al.False Memories for Political Scandals
research-article2019
Corresponding Author:
Gillian Murphy, University College Cork, School of Applied 
Psychology, Cork Enterprise Centre, North Mall, Cork, Ireland 
E-mail: gillian.murphy@ucc.ie
False Memories for Fake News During 
Ireland’s Abortion Referendum
Gillian Murphy1 , Elizabeth F. Loftus2, Rebecca Hofstein Grady2,  
Linda J. Levine2 , and Ciara M. Greene3
1School of Applied Psychology, University College Cork; 2Department of Psychological Science,  
University of California, Irvine; and 3School of Psychology, University College Dublin
Abstract
The current study examined false memories in the week preceding the 2018 Irish abortion referendum. Participants 
(N = 3,140) viewed six news stories concerning campaign events—two fabricated and four authentic. Almost half of the 
sample reported a false memory for at least one fabricated event, with more than one third of participants reporting 
a specific memory of the event. “Yes” voters (those in favor of legalizing abortion) were more likely than “no” voters 
to “remember” a fabricated scandal regarding the campaign to vote “no,” and “no” voters were more likely than “yes” 
voters to “remember” a fabricated scandal regarding the campaign to vote “yes.” This difference was particularly strong 
for voters of low cognitive ability. A subsequent warning about possible misinformation slightly reduced rates of false 
memories but did not eliminate these effects. This study suggests that voters in a real-world political campaign are 
most susceptible to forming false memories for fake news that aligns with their beliefs, in particular if they have low 
cognitive ability.
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player in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, whereas 
conservatives were more likely to “remember” Presi-
dent Obama shaking hands with Iranian President 
Ahmadinejad. Cognitive ability may also predict sus-
ceptibility to false memories. Lower cognitive ability 
has been associated with an increased tendency to 
incorporate postevent information into eyewitness 
memories in both younger adults (Zhu et al., 2010) and 
older adults (Roediger & Geraci, 2007). Individuals 
with lower cognitive ability are also less likely to 
update their attitudes when presented with evidence 
that the basis for their attitudes is inaccurate (De keers-
maecker & Roets, 2017). These findings suggest that 
individuals with lower cognitive ability will be more 
susceptible to forming false memories concerning fab-
ricated political events, and this may be especially true 
for ideologically congruent stories. Because this inter-
action has not yet been assessed, it is unclear whether 
the tendency to falsely remember ideologically congru-
ent events is a result of some insurmountable partisan 
bias that distorts the systematic source-monitoring 
judgment or whether it can be overcome by individuals 
with higher cognitive ability, who likely engage in 
more effective source monitoring.
Although previous studies have recorded false memo-
ries for political events, none have done so during a 
real-world political campaign. Research has demonstrated 
that explicit warnings about the possibility of misinforma-
tion can sometimes modestly reduce false memories and 
beliefs (e.g., Blank & Launay, 2014; Pennycook, Cannon, 
& Rand, 2018; Qin, Ogle, & Goodman, 2008). In every-
day life, however, people are unlikely to encounter 
news stories with explicit warning labels. What are 
sometimes seen are general warnings about unreliable 
news sources, with consumers urged to think critically. 
For example, during Ireland’s 2018 abortion referen-
dum, all Irish Facebook users were presented with tips 
for detecting fake news, and media reports urged voters 
to be vigilant against misleading information (Graham-
Harrison, 2018; Ní Aodha, 2018). Because no previous 
studies have examined false memories during an active 
campaign, it is unclear whether voters in such an envi-
ronment would be susceptible to forming false political 
memories. To explore this issue, we examined the con-
sequences of explicitly warning participants that they 
may have been exposed to fake news. This examination 
of false memories in a high-stakes, highly emotional 
campaign has important applied implications (e.g., 
devising strategies to prevent false voter memories) but 
is also of theoretical importance. It has been argued that 
false memories form because individuals use lax criteria in 
source decisions (Qin et al., 2008) and that warnings may 
encourage stricter source monitoring (Echterhoff, Hirst, & 
Hussy, 2005). If the in-group political-orientation effect 
observed by Frenda et al. (2013) is solely due to lax moni-
toring, it may be moderated under conditions in which 
voters receive warnings that make them suspicious. Like-
wise, it is unclear from previous research whether the effect 
of cognitive ability on false memories is due to a reduced 
tendency to monitor sources effectively or an inability to do 
so even when explicitly warned.
Ireland’s Abortion Referendum
On May 25, 2018, a referendum was held in Ireland to 
repeal the eighth amendment to the constitution. The 
eighth amendment guaranteed “the unborn” a right to 
life equal to that of a pregnant woman; as a conse-
quence, Ireland had some of the most restrictive abor-
tion laws in the world (Taylor, 2015). Abortion has long 
been a deeply divisive issue in Ireland, prompting com-
plex public discourse (McCarthy, O’Donnell, Campbell, 
& Dooley, 2018). The referendum thus provided an 
ideal opportunity to study political false memories 
because it involved an emotional debate between two 
camps with deeply held convictions. Furthermore, a 
1995 Supreme Court decision requires Irish state broad-
casters to provide balanced coverage of both sides of 
a referendum (Reidy & Suiter, 2015). In contrast with 
studies conducted in the partisan environment of U.S. 
politics, in which consumers may choose news sources 
that align with their ideology, this ensured that voters 
were relatively well informed about both campaigns and 
reduced concerns about differences in media consump-
tion. Voter turnout for the referendum was high (64.5%), 
further confirming that this was an important issue for 
the electorate. The landslide victory for a “yes” vote 
(with 66.4% of voters in favor of repealing the abortion 
ban) came as a surprise to most commentators because 
the vote was expected to be close (Bohan, 2018).
The Current Investigation
During the week preceding the referendum, partici-
pants completed an online survey featuring true and 
fabricated campaign events. We tested three hypothe-
ses. First, we expected voters to report more false 
memories for stories consistent with their beliefs (i.e., 
“yes” voters would remember more scandals about the 
campaign to vote “no,” and “no” voters would remem-
ber more scandals about the campaign to vote “yes”). 
Second, we expected lower cognitive ability to be asso-
ciated with increased false memories, particularly for 
stories in line with participants’ beliefs. Third, we 
expected political orientation and cognitive ability to 
predict participants’ ability to identify the fake news 
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stories after they were warned about the possible pres-
ence of misleading information.
Method
Participants
Participants (N = 3,140) were recruited via social media, 
university mailing lists, and an article on TheJournal 
.ie, an Irish online news outlet (for details, see the 
Supplemental Material available online). The mean age 
of the sample was 32.02 years (SD = 13.11). Participants 
reported their biological sex as female (n = 2,122), male 
(n = 991), or other (n = 3); 24 participants declined to 
answer. The majority of the sample (n = 2,342) indi-
cated that they would be voting “yes” (to repeal the 
ban on abortion), 379 indicated that they would be 
voting “no” (to retain the ban on abortion), 147 were 
unsure how they would vote, 128 reported that they 
would not or could not vote, and 144 declined to state 
their voting preference. Although “no” voters were spe-
cifically targeted in recruitment efforts, the online data 
collection was perhaps more suited to “yes” voters; exit 
polls showed that the only age cohort with a majority 
of “no” voters was individuals older than 65 years; 87% 
of 18- to 24-year-olds reported voting “yes” (Leahy, 
2018). We calculated that a sample of 260 participants 
(130 per group) was needed to detect the smallest 
effect size reported in similar studies (Frenda et  al., 
2013).
Materials
The news events presented in this study consisted of 
an unaltered photograph accompanied by a short sum-
mary (for similar methods, see O’Connell & Greene, 
2017; Strange et al., 2011). After reading the story, par-
ticipants were asked whether they remembered the 
event, to which they could respond, “I remember see-
ing/hearing this,” “I don’t remember seeing/hearing this 
but I remember it happening,” “I don’t remember this 
but I believe it happened,” “I remember this differently,” 
or “I don’t remember this.” Unlike participants in previ-
ous studies in this area, participants here were given 
the option of reporting a mere belief that an event had 
happened, allowing the data to speak to the recent 
debate concerning the prevalence of false memories 
versus false beliefs (Brewin & Andrews, 2017; Wade, 
Garry, & Pezdek, 2018). Participants were also asked 
whether they remembered where they had heard about 
the event, and they could select from a range of options 
(e.g., television, social media, a friend, other source) 
or could indicate that they did not remember where 
they had heard it. Finally, participants were asked, 
“How did you feel at the time?” and were provided with 
a text box to write an open-ended response.
Each participant saw four true news stories, selected 
from a potential pool of eight (see the Supplemental 
Material). None of the stories concerned information 
about the referendum itself or the proposed legislative 
changes to ensure that the study did not influence vot-
ing behavior so close to a referendum. Instead, both 
the true and false stories focused on events from the 
campaigns (e.g., the actions of politicians or campaign 
leaders), and there was a balance of positive and nega-
tive events concerning each side.
There was a total of four fabricated news events (see 
Fig. 1). The first story concerned either the “yes” side 
or the “no” side having to destroy campaign posters 
purchased illegally using foreign funds. This story was 
plausible because speculation about foreign interference 
in the referendum had dominated headlines in the pre-
ceding weeks (Ní Aodha, 2018). Facebook announced 
a ban on all ads from foreign sources only 2 weeks 
before the referendum, with Google going further and 
banning all referendum-related ads, citing fears over 
election integrity. Crucially, neither group’s posters 
were found to be funded with foreign money, and none 
were destroyed at any point. The second fabricated 
story linked the referendum campaign to a high-profile 
sexual-assault trial that took place in Northern Ireland 
in 2018. The “yes” and “no” versions of this story were 
designed to specifically tap into existing stereotypes of 
each group of voters—that the “yes” side comprised 
dramatic feminists who were exaggerating the negative 
impact of the eighth amendment, and that the “no” side 
comprised misogynists who did not trust women to 
make their own decisions.
To assess cognitive ability, we invited all participants 
to complete Wordsum at the end of the study. Wordsum 
is a 10-item subtest of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence 
Scale vocabulary test (Wechsler, 2008). Participants are 
presented with a target word and asked to select the 
closest match from a list of five other words (Thorndike 
& Gallup, 1944). Wordsum has been used extensively 
in the General Social Survey in the United States, where 
the average score is 6 correct out of 10 (Meisenberg, 
2015) and is highly correlated with scores from more 
extensive IQ tests (Miner, 1957).
Procedure
The study procedures were approved by the School of 
Applied Psychology Ethics Committee, University Col-
lege Cork. The survey was described to participants as 
“investigating attitudes towards the referendum and the 
two campaigns.” After the participants provided demo-
graphic information, half of them completed questions 
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concerning the referendum, including how they planned 
to vote, how important the referendum was to them, 
and how much they approved of each campaign. The 
remaining participants completed these questions at 
the end of the study. Participants were then presented 
with six news stories (four true and two fabricated) in 
random order. The fabricated stories involved the illegal 
poster (concerning either the “yes” or “no” campaign) 
and the sexual-assault-trial comments (concerning the 
other campaign).
The Together for Yes campaign was forced to
destroy 25,000 campaign posters after evidence
emerged that the posters were bought using
funding received from American pro-choice
lobbyists. 
The Save the 8th campaign was forced to destroy
25,000 campaign posters after evidence emerged
that the posters were bought using funding 
received from American pro-life 
lobbyists. 
Speaking after former Ulster rugby players were found
not guilty of sexual assault, a pro-choice campaigner
made headlines when they said ‘we identify with victims
of rape, as all women in this country have been raped
by the 8th amendment and the patriarchy that 
supports it’.
Speaking after former Ulster rugby players were
found not guilty of sexual assault, a pro-life
campaigner made headlines when they said
‘this verdict is another blow to the pro-abortion 
mantra of “trust women” – clearly not 
all women can be trusted’. 
Fig. 1. The four fabricated news events used in the study. Each participant saw one story about the “yes” campaign (left 
column) and one story about the “no” campaign (right column). One story was drawn from the top row concerning illegal 
posters, and one was drawn from the bottom row concerning a high-profile sexual-assault trial. The image on the bottom 
left was provided by TheJournal.ie, and the image on the bottom right was taken by Aidan Crawley; both are reprinted 
with permission. The two images in the top row were taken by the first author.
False Memories for Political Scandals 5
After viewing all six stories, participants were told 
the following:
Some participants who undertook this survey 
were shown fake news stories (stories concerning 
events that did not happen, entirely fabricated by 
the researchers). If you think you may have been 
shown any fake stories, please select any story 
you believe to be fake.
Finally, participants were debriefed and invited to 
complete Wordsum.
Results
We first dichotomized participants’ responses into 
remembering the event (those who selected the options 
“I remember seeing/hearing this” or “I don’t remember 
seeing/hearing this but I remember it happening”) and 
not remembering the event (those who selected the 
options “I remember this differently” or “I don’t remem-
ber this”). Unless otherwise stated, participants who 
selected “I don’t remember this but I believe it hap-
pened” were removed from the analyses comparing 
those who “remembered” an event with those who did 
not.
On average, participants had a hit rate of 56% for 
the four true stories and a false alarm rate of 32% for 
the two fabricated stories. Almost half (48%) of partici-
pants reported remembering at least one of the two 
fabricated events that they were shown (37% reported 
a specific memory of hearing or seeing one of the 
events; 11% reported a more general memory that the 
event had happened). When the “believe” option was 
included, 63% of participants reported either a memory 
or a belief in at least one of the fabricated events. Par-
ticipants who indicated that they remembered an event 
were more likely to select a specific source where they 
first heard about it (e.g., television, radio, social media) 
for true stories (M = 93.85% across all true stories, 95% 
confidence interval, or CI = [92.23, 95.47]) than for false 
stories (M = 84.73% across all false stories, 95% CI = 
[81.82, 87.64]), t(487) = 5.73, p < .001, d = 0.34.
Hypothesis 1: political orientation
The percentage of true stories remembered by “yes” 
voters (57%) and “no” voters (58%) did not differ sig-
nificantly, t(2719) = 0.53, p = .60 (for responses to each 
true story, see the Supplemental Material). As shown in 
Figure 2, “yes” voters were more likely to remember or 
believe the fabricated “no” poster story (54% remem-
bered or believed) than “no” voters (38% remembered 
or believed), χ2(1, N = 1,312) = 16.11, p < .001, V = .11. 
Similarly, “no” voters were more likely to remember or 
believe the fabricated “yes” poster story (40% remem-
bered or believed) than “yes” voters (30% remembered 
or believed), χ2(1, N = 1,409) = 8.48, p = .004, V = .08.
Importantly, these group differences were evident 
no matter how memories were classified: when compar-
ing only participants who reported a specific memory 
of the event—“no” poster: χ2(1, N = 1,312) = 6.41, p = 
.011, V = .07; “yes” poster: χ2(1, N = 1,409) = 15.01, 
p < .001, V = .10—or when comparing participants who 
reported a specific or general memory of the event but 
excluding those who merely believed it had occurred—
“no” poster: χ2(1, N = 1,126) = 13.10, p < .001, V = .11; 
“yes” poster: χ2(1, N = 1,274) = 12.44, p < .001, V = .10. 
It is worth noting that the “no” poster story may have 
been more believable than the “yes” story overall; 
among participants who indicated that they would not 
be voting, the “no” story (35% remembered) was recalled 
at more than twice the rate of the “yes” story (16% 
remembered), χ2(1, N = 113) = 5.35, p = .02, V = .22.
Qualitative responses to both versions of the story 
suggested that some participants formed rich and 
detailed false memories. Responses to the “no” poster 
story included, “I had my mind made up prior to these 
posters, however, after this story I was disinterested in 
the No campaign as I didn’t agree with the involvement 
of other countries in our countries decisions” (female, 
24 years, voting “yes”) and “‘I don’t think anything 
wrong happened and the posters shouldn’t have been 
burned” (male, 19 years, voting “no”). Responses to the 
“yes” poster story included, “Thought it was hilarious!” 
(male, 71 years, voting “no”) and “I didn’t see why it 
mattered” (female, 19 years, voting “yes”).
Fabricated stories about inflammatory comments 
linking the referendum to a high-profile sexual assault 
did not result in a similar effect. As Figure 3 shows, 
there was no difference between voting groups in rates 
of false memories for either version of the inflammatory-
comments story. For the “no” campaign story, “yes” 
voters were as likely to remember or believe the inflam-
matory comments (49% remembered or believed) as 
were “no” voters (42% remembered or believed), χ2(1, 
N = 1,409) = 3.08, p = .08. Similarly, for the “yes” cam-
paign story, “no” voters were as likely to remember or 
believe the inflammatory comments (47% remembered 
or believed) as were “yes” voters (48% remembered or 
believed), χ2(1, N = 1,312) = 0.10, p = .76.
Examination of qualitative responses to the inflammatory-
comments stories suggests a possible explanation for this 
null finding and led us to focus on the poster stories 
in subsequent analyses. Specifically, some participants’ 
responses focused on the sexual-assault trial itself 
rather than on the fabricated inflammatory comments 
of campaigners after the verdict (e.g., “Angry that the 
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men were innocent and were accused and their careers 
and lives have been extremely negatively influenced 
due to it” and “Don’t think they were as innocent as 
they made out to be”). Because some participants 
focused on the trial (which did occur), whereas others 
focused on the inflammatory comments (which were 
fabricated), it was unclear which feature of the com-
ments stories participants’ memory ratings referred to. 
Therefore, the remaining analyses refer only to the 
poster stories. All of our data (including further 
responses related to the comments stories) have been 
made available online (https://osf.io/9q23j).
Hypothesis 2: cognitive ability
A total of 2,181 participants (69% of the sample: 73% 
of “yes” voters, 71% of “no” voters) completed the 
cognitive-ability test (for a comparison of participants 
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who completed Wordsum and those who did not, see 
the Supplemental Material). The mean score was 7.61 
out of 10 (95% CI = [7.54, 7.68], Mdn = 8). There was 
no difference in cognitive ability between “yes” voters 
(M = 7.61, 95% CI = [7.54, 7.69]) and “no” voters (M = 
7.60, 95% CI = [7.40, 7.81]), t(1977) = 0.09, p = .93. 
A hierarchical binary logistic regression was conducted 
to assess how false memories for the illegal-poster story 
were predicted by ideological congruence—that is, 
whether participants viewed the story that concerned 
the campaign they supported (0) or the opposing cam-
paign (1)—and cognitive ability. This analysis included 
the 1,756 participants who remembered or did not 
remember the fabricated poster story; those who 
selected “I don’t remember this but I believe it hap-
pened” were excluded.
Ideological congruence and cognitive ability were 
entered in the first block, followed by the interaction 
term in the second block. The first model was signifi-
cant, χ2(2, N = 1,756) = 98.81, p < .001, Cox-Snell R2 = 
.06, Nagelkerke R2 = .08, and correctly classified 69.8% 
of cases. As shown in Table 1, there was a main effect 
of ideological congruence; participants were more 
likely to report remembering the false story if it was in 
line with their beliefs. There was also a main effect of 
cognitive ability; participants were 11% less likely to 
report a false memory for every 1-point increase in their 
Wordsum score. The addition of the interaction term in 
the second block improved the model fit (p = .001), 
χ2(3, N = 1,756) = 110.33, p < .001, Cox-Snell R2 = .06, 
Nagelkerke R2 = .09, and correctly classified 70.4% of 
cases. When all other variables were controlled for, 
participants were 14 times more likely to report remem-
bering the false story if it was in line with their beliefs 
(although note the wide CI on this estimate). The main 
effect of cognitive ability was rendered nonsignificant, 
but there was a significant interaction effect, whereby 
participants with higher cognitive ability showed a 
lower ideological-congruence effect.
For illustrative purposes, Figure 4 depicts the per-
centage of participants who “remembered” the fabri-
cated poster stories using a cognitive-ability median 
split. Participants were categorized as having high cog-
nitive ability (8 or higher; n = 1,150) or low cognitive 
ability (7 or lower; n = 1,031).
Hypothesis 3: identifying fabricated 
stories after an explicit warning
After being warned that some of the stories they viewed 
might have been fabricated and being asked to identify 
which ones, participants selected an average of 1.70 of 
the 6 stories they viewed as fake, 95% CI = [1.68, 1.76], 
with 81% of participants choosing between 1 and 3 
stories and 15% failing to select any stories. There was 
no difference in the total number of stories selected as 
fake by “yes” voters (M = 1.72, 95% CI = [1.68, 1.77]) and 
“no” voters (M = 1.74, 95% CI = [1.62, 1.85]), t(2719) = 
0.24, p = .81. The fabricated stories were identified as 
fake (47%) at more than twice the rate of the true stories 
(19%), with the poster stories selected as fake by 52% 
of participants, and the comments stories selected by 
43% of participants. Selection of the true stories as fake 
ranged from 9% to 31%.
Because of the difficulties in assessing responses to 
the comments stories, only the poster-story responses 
were analyzed further. As we expected, participants who 
initially reported remembering the poster story (exclud-
ing believers) were significantly less likely to later select 
it as fake, χ2(1, N = 2,774) = 271.92, p < .001, V = .31. 
Overall, 31% of participants who falsely remembered the 
poster story in the first part of the study then went on 
to select that story as fabricated. This relatively low rate 
suggests robust false memories for 69% of participants, 
Table 1. Results of a Logistic Regression Analysis Predicting False Memories for the Illegal-Poster Story (n = 1,756)
Model and predictor b SE b Wald df p Exp(b)
95% CI for 
exp(b)
Model 1  
 Ideological congruence 0.99 0.11 83.72 1 < .001 2.69 [2.17, 3.32]
 Cognitive ability –0.12 0.03 13.97 1 < .001 0.89 [0.83, 0.95]
 Constant –0.44 0.25 3.01 1 .083 0.65  
Model 2  
 Ideological congruence 2.66 0.51 27.19 1 < .001 14.31 [5.26, 38.90]
 Cognitive ability 0.01 0.05 0.03 1 .870 1.01 [0.92, 1.11]
 Ideological Congruence × Cognitive Ability –0.22 0.67 11.40 1 .001 0.80 [0.70, 0.91]
 Constant –1.40 0.39 13.02 1 < .001 0.25  
Note: Significant predictors are shown in boldface. CI = confidence interval.
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who failed to retract their memory even when alerted 
to the possible presence of misleading information.
To assess factors predicting success in selecting the 
fabricated poster story as fake, we built a hierarchical 
binary logistic regression model using the same vari-
ables as in the earlier regression model (cognitive abil-
ity, ideological congruence, and their interaction). 
Participants were excluded if they did not complete the 
cognitive-ability assessment or did not indicate whether 
they would be voting “yes” or “no.” Ideological congru-
ence and cognitive ability were entered in the first 
block, followed by the interaction term in the second 
block. The first model was significant, χ2(2, N = 1,756) = 
96.26, p < .001, Cox-Snell R2 = .05, Nagelkerke R2 = .06, 
and correctly classified 63% of cases. As shown in Table 
2, there was a main effect of ideological congruence; 
participants were less likely to identify the story as fake 
when it was in line with their beliefs. There was also 
a main effect of cognitive ability; for every 1-point 
increase in their Wordsum score, participants were 13% 
more likely to identify the story as fake.
The addition of the interaction term in the second 
block improved the model fit (p = .003), χ2(3, N = 
1,979) = 105.33, p < .001, Cox-Snell R2 = .05, (Nagelkerke) 
R2 = .07, and correctly classified 63% of cases. There 
was a main effect of ideological congruence; partici-
pants were 88% less likely to identify the story as fake 
when it aligned with their beliefs. As with the false-
memory findings, the main effect of cognitive ability 
was rendered nonsignificant in the second block, but 
there was an interaction between cognitive ability and 
ideological congruence; participants who scored high 
in cognitive ability were more likely to identify stories 
in line with their beliefs as fake.
Discussion
The current study is one of the largest false-memory 
experiments to date, with a sample equating to 1 in 
every 1,000 registered voters in the Republic of Ireland. 
The findings demonstrate the ease with which memo-
ries for fabricated scandals can be created during emo-
tional, highly consequential political campaigns, with 
almost half of participants reporting a false memory. 
The qualitative responses suggest that some partici-
pants created rich false memories, reporting novel 
details (e.g., that the illegal posters were burned). Par-
ticipants were relatively poor at identifying the fake 
stories even after they had been alerted to the study’s 
purpose, further underscoring the strength of these eas-
ily created false memories.
As hypothesized, political orientation impacted false 
memories, with “yes” voters more likely to remember 
the “no” poster scandal than “no” voters, and “no” voters 
more likely to remember the “yes” poster scandal than 
“yes” voters. The current study is the first to demonstrate 
this during a real campaign. A novel contribution of this 
study is the use of identical stories for both sides, reduc-
ing concerns about matching story complexity. How-
ever, the data suggest that “yes” voters were especially 
likely to remember the fabricated “no” poster story. We 
do not believe that this is indicative of any difference 
in gullibility between voting groups, especially in light 
of the fact that no difference in cognitive ability was 
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observed between “yes” and “no” voters, but rather that 
the poster story was more easily attributable to the “no” 
campaign. This is likely because foreign-funding accusa-
tions were more common for the “no” campaign (Graham-
Harrison, 2018).
Importantly, the difference between “yes” and “no” 
voters was evident for the poster story no matter how 
memories were classified: assessing precise memories 
only or including more general memories or beliefs. It 
has been suggested that studies may overestimate false 
memories by participants who simply find an event 
believable (Wade et al., 2018). Here, we clearly distin-
guished between these two possibilities, and even omit-
ting participants who merely believed the event 
occurred, we found that 34% of participants reported 
false memories for the illegal posters. The participants 
in the current study were self-selected and likely highly 
interested in the referendum. Because interest in a topic 
has been shown to increase false memories (O’Connell 
& Greene, 2017), the observed rate of false memory is 
likely to be characteristic of groups who are invested 
in political campaigns.
In the final regression model, there was no main effect 
of cognitive ability, suggesting that lower cognitive abil-
ity did not globally increase false memories. Instead, 
lower cognitive ability was associated with an increased 
effect of ideological congruence on false memories. This 
finding contributes to research that has identified the 
propensity to engage in analytic thinking as a predictor 
of resistance to fake news (Pennycook & Rand, 2019) 
but further suggests that high cognitive ability may allow 
individuals to overcome the biasing effect of political 
orientation and more effectively monitor the sources of 
their memories. This is important in understanding the 
role of bias in source-monitoring judgments and suggests 
that individual differences in susceptibility to fake news 
are complex and multilayered.
Perhaps because of the many warnings of fake news 
circulating in Irish media at the time of the survey, 
participants often seemed suspicious of our motives 
(e.g., “Did this happen? . . . Is this survey a No campaign 
scam?” and “I think this survey is incredibly biased 
towards Yes”). That the political-orientation and 
cognitive-ability effects persisted despite this suspicion 
and, indeed, despite an explicit warning about possible 
fake news in the second part of the study suggests that 
these effects cannot simply be eliminated by encourag-
ing stricter source monitoring (Echterhoff et al., 2005). 
This suggests that political orientation, especially when 
combined with low cognitive ability, may bias the heu-
ristic and systematic source-monitoring judgments to 
such an extent that warnings do not eradicate the 
effects. This has applied implications for combating 
fake news and merits further study.
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